Lists of species underpin many fields of human endeavour, but there are currently no universally accepted principles for deciding which biological species should be accepted when there are alternative taxonomic treatments (and, by extension, which scientific names should be applied to those species). As improvements in information technology make it easier to communicate, access, and aggregate biodiversity information, there is a need for a framework that helps taxonomists and the users of taxonomy decide which taxa and names should be used (...) by society whilst continuing to encourage taxonomic research that leads to new species discoveries, new knowledge of species relationships, and the refinement of existing species concepts. Here, we present 10 principles that can underpin such a governance framework, namely (i) the species list must be based on science and free from nontaxonomic considerations and interference, (ii) governance of the species list must aim for community support and use, (iii) all decisions about list composition must be transparent, (iv) the governance of validated lists of species is separate from the governance of the names of taxa, (v) governance of lists of accepted species must not constrain academic freedom, (vi) the set of criteria considered sufficient to recognise species boundaries may appropriately vary between different taxonomic groups but should be consistent when possible, (vii) a global list must balance conflicting needs for currency and stability by having archived versions, (viii) contributors need appropriate recognition, (ix) list content should be traceable, and (x) a global listing process needs both to encompass global diversity and to accommodate local knowledge of that diversity. We conclude by outlining issues that must be resolved if such a system of taxonomic list governance and a unified list of accepted scientific names generated are to be universally adopted. (shrink)

We suggest a new view of secretory and membrane protein folding that emphasizes the role of pathways of biogenesis in generating functional and conformational heterogeneity. In this view, heterogeneity results from action of accessory factors either directly binding specific sequences of the nascent chain, or indirectly, changing the environment in which a particular domain is synthesized. Entrained by signaling pathways, these variables create a combinatorial set of necessary‐but‐not‐sufficient conditions that enhance synthesis and folding of particular alternate, functional, conformational forms. We (...) therefore propose that protein conformation is productively regulated by the cell during translocation across the endoplasmic reticulum (ER), a concept that may account for currently poorly understood aspects of physiological function, natural selection, and disease pathogenesis. BioEssays 24:741–748, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Goethe's objections to Newton's theory of light and colours are better than often acknowledged. You can accept the most important elements of these objections without disagreeing with Newton about light and colours. As I will argue, Goethe exposed a crucial weakness of Newton's methodological self-assessment. Newton believed that with the help of his prism experiments, he could prove that sunlight was composed of variously coloured rays of light. Goethe showed that this step from observation to theory is more problematic than (...) Newton wanted to admit. By insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by the phenomena, Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And Goethe's insight is surprisingly significant, because he correctly claimed that all of the results of Newton's prism experiments fit a theoretical alternative equally well. If this is correct, then by suggesting an alternative to a well-established physical theory, Goethe developed the problem of underdete... (shrink)

Goethe carried out an enormous number of experiments before criticizing Newton's theory of light and colours in the Farbenlehre (1810). He managed to show that Newton's reasoning is based on a rather narrow choice of experiments, in which parameters such as the distance between the prism and the screen are fixed arbitrarily: Newton's famous spectrum (with its green centre) occurs only at a specific distance. Once you reduce the distance, the green centre disappears, and you see the two border spectra (...) instead. Newton can of course explain these border spectra; but things can be explained just as well the other way around: Then you start with a theory based on the two border spectra in order to derive the Newtonian spectrum. Both accounts fit many data (available in Newton and Goethe's days) equally well. Thus by insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by "reason and experiments" alone (as Newton would have it), Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And surprisingly, his theory of the prismatic colours seems no worse off than Newton's, even taking into account additional criteria of theory choice, such as simplicity or elegance. (shrink)

Bradford Hill (1965) highlighted nine aspects of the complex evidential situation a medical researcher faces when determining whether a causal relation exists between a disease and various conditions associated with it. These aspects are widely cited in the literature on epidemiological inference as justifying an inference to a causal claim, but the epistemological basis of the Hill aspects is not understood. We offer an explanatory coherentist interpretation, explicated by Thagard's ECHO model of explanatory coherence. The ECHO model captures the complexity (...) of epidemiological inference and provides a tractable model for inferring disease causation. We apply this model to three cases: the inference of a causal connection between the Zika virus and birth defects, the classic inference that smoking causes cancer, and John Snow’s inference about the cause of cholera. (shrink)

Although Lorenz Oken is a classic example of Naturphilosophie as applied to biology, his views have been imperfectly understood. He is best viewed as a follower of Schelling who consistently attempted to apply Schelling's ideas to biological data. His version of Naturphilosophie, however, was strongly influenced by older pseudoscience traditions, especially alchemy and numerology as they had been presented by Robert Fludd, whose works were current in Jena and available to him. According to those influences, parts of Oken's philosophical conception (...) were communicable even in a non-idealistic scientific culture, for example in Paris, where Oken met Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. Geoffroy however was embedded in a French intellectual tradition, and the correspondence between his views and those of Oken was only superficial. The English anatomist Richard Owen attempted to incorporate the views of Oken and Geoffroy within his own, idiosyncratic system. Although Darwin knew of Oken's ideas, it was Geoffroy who really affected his evolutionary biology, and any influence of Oken must have been attenuated to the point of triviality. (shrink)

Cosmological narratives like the creation story in the book of Genesis or the modern Big Bang are popularly understood to be descriptions of how the universe was created. However, cosmologies also say a great deal more. Indeed, the majority of cosmologies, ancient and modern, explore not simply how the world was made but how humans relate to their surrounding environment and the often thin line which separates humans from gods and animals. Combining approaches from classical studies, anthropology, and philosophy, this (...) book studies three competing cosmologies of the early Greek world: Hesiod's Theogony; the Orphic Derveni theogony; and Protagoras' creation myth in Plato's eponymous dialogue. Although all three cosmologies are part of a single mythic tradition and feature a number of similar events and characters, Olaf Almqvist argues they offer very different answers to an ongoing debate on what it is to be human. Engaging closely with the ontological turn in anthropology and in particular with the work of Philippe Descola, this book outlines three key sets of ontological assumptions - analogism, pantheism, and naturalism - found in early Greek literature and explores how these competing ontological assumptions result in contrasting attitudes to rituals such as prayer and sacrifice. (shrink)

Randolph Bourne was only thirty-two when he died in 1918, but he left a legacy of astonishingly mature and incisive writings on politics, literature, and culture, which were of enormous influence in shaping the American intellectual climate of the 1920s and 1930s. This definitive collection, back in print at last, includes such noted essays as "The War and the Intellectuals," "The Fragment of the State," "The Development of Public Opinion," and "John Dewey's Philosophy." Bourne's critique of militarism and advocacy of (...) cultural pluralism are enduring contributions to social and political thought, sure to have an equally strong impact in our own time. In their introduction and preface, Olaf Hansen and Christopher Lasch provide biographical and historical context for Bourne's work. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Ted Poston's theory of explanatory coherentism is well-suited as a tool for causal explanation in the health sciences, particularly in epidemiology. Coherence has not only played a role in epidemiology for more than half a century as one of Hill's viewpoints, it can also provide background theory for the development of explanatory systems by integrating epidemiologic evidence with a diversity of other error-independent data. I propose that computational formalization of Hill's viewpoints in an explanatory (...) coherentist framework would provide an excellent starting point for a formal epistemological (knowledge-theoretical) project designed to improve causal explanation in the health sciences. As an example, I briefly introduce Paul Thagard's ECHO system and offer my responses to possible objections to my proposal. (shrink)

It is shown that the method of operationaldefinition of theoretical terms applied inphysics may well support constructivist ideasin cognitive sciences when extended toobservational terms. This leads to unexpectedresults for the notion of reality, inductionand for the problem why mathematics is sosuccessful in physics.A theory of cognitive operators is proposedwhich are implemented somewhere in our brainand which transform certain states of oursensory apparatus into what we call perceptionsin the same sense as measurement devicestransform the interaction with the object intomeasurement results. Then, (...) perceivedregularities, as well as the laws of nature wewould derive from them can be seen asinvariants of the cognitive operators concernedand are by this human specific constructsrather than ontologically independent elements.. So, reality in so far it isrepresented by the laws of nature has no longeran independent ontological status. This isopposed to Campbell's `natural selectionepistemology'. From this it is shown that thereholds an incompleteness theorem for physicallaws similar to Gödels incompletenesstheorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there isno definitive or object `theory of everything'.This constructivist approaches to cognitionwill allow a coherent and consistent model ofboth cognitive and organic evolution. Whereasthe classical view sees the two evolutionrather dichotomously. (shrink)

Are we perhaps in the "matrix", or anyway, victims of perfect and permanent computer simulation? No. The most convincing—and shortest—version of Putnam's argument against the possibility of our eternal envattment is due to Crispin Wright (1994). It avoids most of the misunderstandings that have been elicited by Putnam's original presentation of the argument in "Reason, Truth and History" (1981). But it is still open to the charge of question-begging. True enough, the premisses of the argument (disquotation and externalism) can be (...) formulated and defended without presupposing external objects whose existence appears doubtful in the light of the very skeptical scenario which Putnam wants to repudiate. However, the argument is only valid if we add an extra premiss as to the existence of some external objects. In order to avoid circularity, we should run the argument with external objects which must exist even if we are brains in a vat, e.g. with computers rather than with trees. As long as the skeptic is engaged in a discussion of the brain-in-a-vat scenario, she should neither deny the existence of computers nor the existence of causal relations; for if she does, she is in fact denying that we are brains in a vat. (shrink)

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but rather often about factual questions as well—as seen when looking at the controversy surrounding the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not surprising since the pacifist,legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of an alternative value system, and the quarrel between the two parties about supposedly descriptive matters (...) never ceases, as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue.In my view, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality implicitly obeys three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from the other point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Hone your senses to the uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly to the danger of military escalation leading to another world war"). Objective reality has no way of telling us how far we should go in following these imperatives. Rather, we have to make the decision about how far we are going to take them ourselves. In this way, the pacifist's epistemic imperatives are comparable to Kant's regulative principles. (shrink)

I wish to propose a new doctrine called epistemological pacifism. According to the doctrine, our objective knowledge concerning hard facts about a given war and its context is far too poor to justify entering that war. Our best and most informative accounts of any pre-war situation are value-laden; the same is true of counterfactual claims about any event during, or after, war. Here we have three new types of what has been discussed under the label of fact/value entanglement. Realizing this (...) helps us understand why pacifists and their opponents never agree about so-called facts. Both parties bring to bear different values in their descriptions. Although this is legitimate for both sides, the values of the pacifist are more attractive than those of the bellicist. The recent war in Mali is a case in point, as I’ll sketch at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Goethe und Schelling begannen ihre Zusammenarbeit mit intensiven optischen Experimenten. Schelling lernte von Goethe, dass sich viele Farbphänomene bipolar anordnen lassen und dass eine optische Symmetrie bzw. Dualität zwischen weißem Licht und schwarzem Schatten besteht. Goethe lernte von Schelling, dass man das Prinzip der Bipolarität als forschungsleitende Idee verstehen kann (als eine regulative Idee in Kants Sinn). In der optischen Forschung kommt man mit dieser Idee wesentlich weiter, als gemeinhin angenommen wird; ihr Potential ist bis heute nicht ausgeschöpft. Sie ist (...) u.a. deshalb in der Versenkung verschwunden, weil ihre Verfechter mit ihr unseriös über die Stränge schlugen – außerhalb der Optik. Wenn sich das hätte vermeiden lassen, wäre Goethes Farbenlehre von Physikern möglicherweise weniger feindselig aufgenommen worden. Pech für Goethe. (shrink)

Militärtechnisch könnte der Westen (und sogar Deutschland alleine) einen Krieg gegen den Islamischen Staat (IS) gewinnen; aber es wäre ein weiterer Pyrrhussieg über radikale Kräfte unter islamischer Flagge. Wenn wir uns für die Folgen unseres Nichtstuns verantwortlich fühlen sollen, dann sind wir erst recht verantwortlich für die fatalen Neben-, Spät- und Langzeitfolgen unserer Interventionen im Nahen Osten : Die Region ist voller Waffen (die zum erheblichen Teil von uns stammen) und voller Fanatiker, die auch wegen unserer Anwesenheit immer neu radikalen (...) Zulauf finden. Nach all diesen entmutigenden Erfahrungen sollten wir uns eingestehen, dass wir uns überschätzt haben und gescheitert sind. Um der Konfrontation auf lange Sicht ein Ende zu bereiten, sollten wir aus der Region vollständig abziehen, keine Waffen liefern – und in der muslimischen Welt um Entschuldigung für unsere vormalige Hybris bitten. Der Frieden im Nahen Osten muss von den dort Wohnenden selber gefunden werden. (shrink)

In the seventeenth century, Newton used bis famous prism to found the physics of spectral light, thus revolutionising our thinking about colours; more than a hundred years later, Goethe protested against Newton's theory and discovered a number of new prismatic colour phenomena. Did these episodes in the history of science have any influence on the visual arts? For a decade now my visits to art museums have had an agenda: I have been looking for nineteenth-century paintings with certain spectral colour (...) (which will be described in the first half of this paper). While my search has been unsuccessful in traditional Western art, I found what I was looking for in Japa­nese art: in woodblock prints by Hokusai and Hiroshige. This is surprising; little Western science had reached Japan in their time. The second half of the paper pre­sents this riddle, which I am nowhere near solving. Even without a solution, however, a riddle can be instructive. In this case, it may help to bring into focus the fascinating exchange between two distant cultures. Much has been written on the cultural relativ­ity of colour perception, colour systematisation and colour aesthetics; I want to intro­duce a new and so far unknown case that might contribute to this debate - though the debate itself remains beyond the scope of this paper. (shrink)

Worin besteht Mills Argument für den Utilitarismus? Im psychologischen Teil des Arguments plädiert Mill für eine aggregierte Beschreibung unserer hedonistischen Werte ("Das allgemeine Glück ist ein Gut für die Gesamtheit aller Personen"). Von hier aus steuert er im normativen Teil des Arguments auf eine aggregierte Bewertung zu ("Das allgemeine Glück ist ein Gut"). Mills Übergang von Beschreibung zu Wertung beruht auf zwei versteckten Annahmen: Die erste sagt (gegen den Nihilisten), dass es Werte gibt; die zweite sagt (gegen Wert-Metaphysiker), dass die (...) Antwort auf die Frage nach Werten nicht völlig unabhängig von dem sein kann, was wir alle de facto für wert erachten. Diese beiden Voraussetzungen scheinen keine inhaltlichen Aussagen zur Moral zu enthalten. Doch wer sie teilt, wird von Mills Argument überraschend weit in die Gefilde der Moral getrieben. Sein Argument ist besser, als die meisten Interpreten glauben. (shrink)

In his study on 'schelling's and hegel's verhaltnis zur naturwissenschaft' of 1844 m j schleiden, one of the leading biologists of that time, opposed the speculative idealism. his work marks the change of the german biology to a science that is founded on materialistic assumptions. it gives the essence of a discussion that is not only interesting in a historical perspective but accentuated an ongoing controversy.

The aim of this paper is to reconcile the two modes of description of macrosystems, i.e., to remove certain inconsistencies between the classical phenomenological and the quantum-theoretical descriptions of a macrosystem. Starting from Ludwig's formulation of a general framework for classical theories and his ansatz for a compatibility condition between the quantum theoretical and the classical mode of description for a macrosystem, we try to make clear what the “classical content” of many-body quantum theory really is. It is shown that (...) this classical content may be described by a certain “observable,” i.e., an operator-valued measure over the Borel sets of the classical trajectory space. There exists a reduced time evolution within this classical content which has the structure of a true semigroup in case of an irreversible classical time evolution. (shrink)

My philosophical case study concerns textbook presentations of the theory of demand. Does this theory contain anything more than just a collection of tautologies? In order to determine its empirical content, it must be viewed holistically. But then, the theory implies false factual claims. We can avoid this result by embracing the theory’s normative character. The resulting consequences will be illuminated with the new autodetermination thesis recently proposed in the philosophy of physics by Oliver Timmer. Applying his ideas to the (...) theory of demand reveals that the statements of this discipline simultaneously concern both values and facts. (shrink)

Most of Kant's examples for synthetic sentences known apriori have been repudiated by modern physics. Is there a way to modify Kantian anti-empiricist epistemology so that it no longer contradicts the results of modern science? Michael Friedman proposes to relativize Kant's notion of the apriori and thus to explain away the apparent contradiction. But how do we have to understand the relative apriori? I define a sentence to be known apriori relative to a given theory if the sentence makes it (...) possible to test objective knowledge claims that belong within the frame of that theory. Are there sentences that can be known apriori relative to every possible theory, i.e., are there any examples for absolute aprioricity? My answer is to the positive. By weakening Kant's original examples (e.g., the principle of causality) we arrive at sentences that must be true if objective empirical knowledge is to be possible at all. The sentence "Not every change is due to pure chance" is an absolute example for synthetic apriori knowledge. (shrink)

Quine behauptet, dass uns der Holismus (d.h. die Quine/Duhem-These) daran hindert, Synonymie zu definieren. In "Word and Object" weist er einen Synonymiebegriff zurück, der selbst dann gut funktioniert, wenn der Holismus zutrifft. Dieser Begriff lässt sich so definieren: R und S sind synonym, wenn für alle Sätze T die logische Konjunktion aus R und T reizsynonym zur Konjunktion aus S und T ist. Dieser Begriff entgeht Quines bedeutungsskeptischen, holistischen Einwänden. Anders als Quine gemeint hat, ist der Begriff enger als sein (...) Begriff der Reizsynonymie – insbesondere bei Anwendung auf Sätze mit weniger als kritischer semantischer Masse. Fazit: Wir können Synonymie selbst dann sauber definieren, wenn wir Quines Holismus, Naturalismus, Behaviorismus und radikale Übersetzung mitmachen. Quines Bedeutungsskepsis sollte sogar auf Quines eigenem Territorium zurückgewiesen werden. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is twofold. First, I want to analyze two early texts by Vilém Flusser in order to explore what may have been his conceptualization of the relationship between science and philosophy. My analysis suggests that Flusser thought of both as tools to analyze reality by analyzing language. While he saw science as a (sometimes too vigorous) force forward, he viewed philosophy as what can prevent some of the negative consequences of such progress. In direct comparison, Flusser (...) thought of science as a discourse with the purpose to provide novel information and of philosophy as what can keep objective science in check by moving the discourse into the realm of the subjective. It remains to be explored whether these results also apply to Flusser’s later writings. My second goal is to show the relationship between three aspects of modern science (crisis, contrast, and trying out) and what I see as Flusser’s early (mid 1960s) view of science in relation to philosophy and poetry. -/- . (shrink)

Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do. If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an (...) ideal utilitarian, that is, an ideal ethical agent whose ethical theory says that our only moral obligation consists in maximizing utility? I claim that an ideal agent cannot be utilitarian. My reasoning against ideal utilitarianism will parallel Putnam's famous argument against the brains in a vat. Putnam argues that an envatted brain cannot describe its own situation because its words do not refer to brains and vats; I argue that an ideal utilitarian cannot entertain or communicate the beliefs necessary to being a utilitarian. (shrink)

When it became uncool to speak of beauty with respect to pieces of art, physicists started claiming that their results are beautiful. They say, for example, that a theory's beauty speaks in favour of its truth, and that they strive to perform beautiful experiments. What does that mean? The notion cannot be defined. (It cannot be defined in the arts either). Therefore, I elucidate it with examples of optical experimentation. Desaguliers' white synthesis, for example, is more beautiful than Newton's, and (...) the many colourful syntheses done by Viennese painter Ingo Nussbaumer exemplify even greater beauty. Here are some criteria (which, of course, do not implement a decision procedure concerning beauty in experiments): cleanliness, simplicity, intellectual clarity, symmetry. Similar criteria are relevant to our aesthetical judgements about some pieces of music. So we can assume that our notion of beauty conserning art is related to the one conserning scientific experiments. (shrink)

Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In Word and Object, he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...) did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy – particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5). Conclusion: We can have well-defined notions of synonymy and analyticity even if we embrace Quine's holism, naturalism, behaviorism, and radical translation. Quine's meaning skepticism is to be repudiated on Quinean grounds. (shrink)

Can we conceive of a mind without body? Does, for example, the idea of the soul's immortality make sense? Certain versions of materialism deny such questions; I shall try to prove that these versions of materialism cannot be right. They fail because they cannot account for the mental vocabulary from the language of brains in the vat. Envatted expressions such as "I think", "I believe", etc., do not have to be reinterpreted when we translate them to our language; they are (...) semantically stable. By contrast, physical expressions from the vat language are semantically instable; due to Putnam's externalism they cannot be transported to our language without change. This contrast opens the way to a new understanding of what the immortality of the soul might be like: A brain in a vat (and its mental life) might survive what the brain calls "my physical body's death". (shrink)

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but most often about factual questions as well (as is illustrated by the controversy surrounding the crisis in Kosovo in 1999). According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not surprising, since the pacifist, legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of values. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of an alternative value system. And the quarrel between the two parties about (...) supposedly descriptive matters never ceases, as there is no objective reality that could settle the issue. The pacifist’s value-laden perspective on reality is informed by Christian charity and humility: a specific mixture of optimism (about human nature) and pessimism (about human powers). (shrink)

My first claim is about ethical knowledge. There are moral "observations sentences" (according to Quine's definition); example: "This is visibly wrong". My second claim is about radical translation of moral discourse. When interpreting another culture's moral observation sentences, we cannot (pace Davidson) rely on the principle of charity to maximize agreement concerning content and truth of moral statements. Rather, the principle must be combined with the slogan that meaning is use; in this generalized version, the principle maximizes agreement concerning the (...) action-guiding function of moral statements. The natives cannot always act against their moral statements. This repudiates amoralism. (shrink)

The analytic/synthetic distinction can be conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others. From without, the central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid talking nonsense? Both (...) perspectives on analytic sentences do not mutually exclude but supplement and illuminate each other. In "Two Dogmas", Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction comes from within, whereas in Word and Object, Quine repeats his earlier criticism from without. His criticism is directed against Carnap's views on our understanding of theoretical terms. I challenge Quine's criticism in both of its versions and provide two definitions for analyticity that are immune to Quine's arguments. Using the first of these definitions (the one from without) I try to show how it is possible to distinguish (genuine) belief revision from linguistic change—even in case of a scientific revolution. (shrink)

Benjamin Libet's celebrated experiments concerning freedom elicited numerous attempts of _philosophical_ repudiation. Ten years ago, however, Judy Trevena and Jeff Miller published a _technical_ objection; they claim to have detected a,,smearing artifact" in Libet's calculations. This rests on a misunderstanding of Libet's methodology. In my reconstruction of Libet's argument, he draws an abductive inference to the best explanation. Now, Trevena's and Miller's objection does indeed lead to alternative explanations of Libet's measurements. These alternatives are _ad hoc_ and extremely improbable. They (...) constitute worse explanations than the explanation offered by Libet. _German_ Benjamin Libets bahnbrechende Experimente zur Willensfreiheit aus den Achtziger Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts gehören längst zu den Klassikern der Experimentalkunst. Aus _philosophischer_ Perspektive sind sie oft kritisiert worden; unabhängig davon ist zu Beginn des neuen Jahrtausends ein _technischer_ Einwand gegen Libet prominent geworden, der von Freiheitsfreunden gerne zitiert wird. Er geht auf Judy Trevena und Jeff Miller zurück und besteht in dem Vorwurf, dass Libet mit seiner Berechnung der _gemittelten_ Bereitschaftspotential-Kurven die wahren Verhältnisse verschmiere und dabei aus mathematischen Gründen den Anstiegs-Zeitpunkt des Bereitschaftspotentials künstlich nach vorne verschiebe – das ist der Vorwurf des sog. Verschmierungsartefakts. Ich zeige, dass der Vorwurf nicht sticht. Er beruht auf einem Missverständnis der Schlussmethode Libets. Laut meiner wissenschaftstheoretischen Rekonstruktion zieht Libet weder deduktive noch induktive Schlüsse aus seinen Einzelbeobachtungen; er schließt abduktiv, d.h. er schließt auf die beste Erklärung seiner Einzelbeobachtungen. Wie eine genaue arithmetische Analyse zeigt, bieten die Alternativ-Erklärungen, unter denen sich das Verschmierungsartefakt bewahrheiten würde, schlechtere Erklärungen als Libets Erklärung – sie sind an den Haaren herbeigezogen und extrem unwahrscheinlich. (shrink)

We use quotation marks when we wish to refer to an expression. We can and do so refer even when this expression is composed of characters that do not occur in our alphabet. That's why Tarski, Quine, and Geach's theories of quotation don't work. The proposals of Davidson, Frege, and C. Washington, however, do not provide a plausible account of quotation either. (Section I). The problem is to construct a Tarskian theory of truth for an object language that contains quotation (...) marks, without appealing to quotation marks in the metalanguage. I propose to supply Tarski's truth definition with one axiom that determines the denotation of all expressions containing quotation marks. According to this axiom, quotation marks create a non-extensional context. Since admitting such contexts does not lead to any difficulties in the recursive truth characterization, we may indeed dispense with extensionalism. (Section II). Finally, I argue that we classify and denote expressions in the very same way that we classify and denote extralinguistic entities. Both tokens and types of written signs can be easily incorporated into the naturalist's worldview. (Section III). (shrink)

Quine's early arguments in favor of "Ontological Relativity" depend on wild but interesting alternatives to standard ontology,most apparent when viewing his unusual idea of undetached object parts. In Quine's later philosophy, by contrast, he invokes trivial proxy functions and simple permutations to standard ontology, and in so doing paves the way for his claim of "Inscrutability of Reference". Nevertheless, Quine's more recent alternatives to standard ontology have thus far remained uninteresting for ontological questions, as his later arguments fail to offer (...) any real alternative to our standard identity relation. For this reason, I have chosen to return to Quine's original idea of "Ontological Relativity" and put it to the test. In my investigation, development and subsequent defense of Quine's original presentation, I attempt to show that it is in fact possible to read Quine's ontology of undetached object parts into a large sphere of our language. (shrink)

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but most often about factual questions as well. For example, they came to divergent descriptions of the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not a surprise because the pacifist, legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of alternative systems of value, and the quarrel between the two parties about (...) supposedly descriptive matters does not come to an end as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue. If I am right, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality can be reconstructed as an obedience to three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist against demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from their point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to projected military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Sharpen your attention for uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly for the danger of escalation to another world war"). Objective reality does not decide how far one should go in following these imperatives. Rather, the decision about this is our's—similarly as in case of the scientist who decides to search for common deep structure behind the chaos of the manifold. So the pacifist's epistemic imperatives can be compared to Kant's regulative principles that are necessary for guiding the scientific scrutiny of reality. (shrink)

Rarely does research in the history and philosophy of science lead to new empirical results, but that is exactly what has happened in one of the essays of this special issue: Rang and Grebe-Ellis have developed new experimental techniques to perform measurements Goethe proposed 217 years ago. These measurements fit neatly with Goethe’s idea of polarity—his complementary spectrum is not only an optical, but also a thermodynamical counterpart of Newton’s spectrum. I use the new measurements, firstly, to argue against the (...) asymmetries between light and darkness posited by Lyre and Schreiber; and, secondly, to explicate the alternative theory that Goethe had introduced to urge scientific pluralism. In my replies to exegetical criticism by Böhler, Hampe and Zemplén, I show that the main goal of Goethe’s Farbenlehre was indeed to expose symmetries between light and darkness. Furthermore, I argue that it is worthwhile to focus on the experiments, arguments and hypotheses of the Farbenlehre, and not merely on rhetorical, narrative or stylistical aspects, as Böhler and Hampe would have it. Goethe’s criticism of Newton is often dismissed, but it is in fact surprisingly relevant today. (shrink)

Independently and pursuing different aims, Hrushovski and Srour (On stable non-equational theories. Unpublished manuscript, 1989) and Baudisch and Pillay (J Symb Log 65(1):443–460, 2000) have introduced two free pseudospaces that generalize the well know concept of Lachlan’s free pseudoplane. In this paper we investigate the relationship between these free pseudospaces, proving in particular, that the pseudospace of Baudisch and Pillay is a reduct of the pseudospace of Hrushovski and Srour.

Default logic is one of the most popular and successful formalisms for non-monotonic reasoning. In 2002, Bonatti and Olivetti introduced several sequent calculi for credulous and skeptical reasoning in propositional default logic. In this paper we examine these calculi from a proof-complexity perspective. In particular, we show that the calculus for credulous reasoning obeys almost the same bounds on the proof size as Gentzen’s system LK. Hence proving lower bounds for credulous reasoning will be as hard as proving lower bounds (...) for LK. On the other hand, we show an exponential lower bound to the proof size in Bonatti and Olivetti’s enhanced calculus for skeptical default reasoning. (shrink)

Concepts of enlightenment were developed and transmitted to modern times. From that perspective, one has to understand classic and romanticism as a kind of culmination of European enlightenment, thereby describing romanticisms as a European phenomenon. Here, our ideas of freedom, personality and governance, the concept of science, the idea of rationality and, in particular, the disciplinarily defined rationality originated. It is the Kantian perspective, by which we now look on rationality. It is the Hegelian idea of system and coherence, we (...) test our hypothesis with, It is Baumgarten’s aesthetics, and it is the way, Fichte argued about the principle consequences of liberalization in French revolution that came into our discussions about jurisdiction, personal liberty, state and governance. And it is that new idea of an expert system driven rationality that we are accustomed to, in between. This form of rationality originated at the end of the 18th century and has been transferred in its essential methodological characteristics to our time. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to show that the formalism of equilibrium quantum statistical mechanics can fully be incorporated into Ludwig's embedding scheme for classical theories in many-body quantum mechanics. A construction procedure based on a recently developed reconstruction procedure for the so-called macro-observable is presented which leads to the explicit determination of the set of classical ensembles compatible with the embedding scheme.

The CISG is now being applied extensively both by international arbitral tribunals and by domestic courts of its more than 70 contracting states. But do they also apply it in the same manner? Although Article 7 of the CISG underscores "the need to promote uniformity in its application", it gives little guidance as to how to achieve this goal. Each judge and arbitrator is influenced by the legal methodology of his home jurisdiction. Therefore it is somewhat of a paradox that (...) whilst the number of contracting states is constantly increasing so too is the threat of variation in application. In this book the most important issues of the CISG's methodology are analysed by leading experts from five continents. Whereas some authors provide a thorough analysis of the central topics of interpretation, others enter almost uncharted territories. (shrink)

Two rival passions are at work in men's hearts to-day, the cult of individuality and the cult of society. They give rise all too often to extravagant praise of liberty and to a no less extravagant insistence on discipline for society's sake. It is impossible to form a balanced idea of the functions of liberty and discipline, or of the right relation between the individual and his social environment, without having a clear view of the nature of personality and community. (...) I offer a brief and dogmatic sketch of this subject. A personality is the product of the impact of the objective universe, past and present, on a particular experiencing subject. I do not wish to imply that a “subject” is necessarily a substance or a metaphysical ego, or an immortal soul. Whether such eternal individual spirits exist or not, I do not pretend to know. I do not even, by the word “subject,” pledge myself to what Professor Broad has called a “centred theory” of the nature of mind, I do not know whether a mind is a system of experiences united in an enduring centre, as the spokes of a wheel are united in the hub; or whether it is a centreless “net” of experiences all related together in a special way. By “subject” I mean only “that which experiences,” whatever the true philosophical account of it. I mean the seeming focus or centre of experience and action. This focus is in some sense located in time and space, in fact it is located within the organism. For my purpose the subject is simply that to which experience happens, and that which responds with conscious behaviour. I do not wish to raise the epistemological problem. I merely assume the rejection of solipsism, and the reality of an objective universe which the individual experiences, however imperfectly. (shrink)

This essay outlines the history of Alexandrism in the Middle Ages, focusing on the reception of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the late-medieval universities. Alexander of Aphrodisias met with severe criticism in the 13th century from William of Auvergne, Albert the Great and Thomas of Aquinas among others, but in the 14th century this attitude changed completely with John Buridan, giving way to a positive and productive adoption of his theories. The centerpiece of the controversy was Alexander's doctrine that the human (...) soul is similar to the animal soul and hence mortal "like the soul of a dog or a donkey." Previously condemned as the absurd thesis of an outsider - wrongly so, because Alexander was perfectly in line with a long peripatetic tradition beginning with Dikaiarch of Messene and Straton of Lampsakos -, this doctrine was now considered philosophically superior to and sounder than the competing theories of Averroes and the Roman Catholic faith. In connection with this doctrine, Buridan stated that some higher species of animals have the ability to think like a man or an ape and that an ape can even be said to have some reason. Buridan's interpretation of Alexander was disseminated at the universities of the 14th and 15th centuries by his many followers, including Lawrence of Lindores, Marsilius of Inghen, Nicholas of Amsterdam, Biagio Pelacani of Parma and Benedikt Hesse of Kraków. (shrink)

Starting from a passage in the treatise De universali reali by Jean de Maisonneuve, where Jean de Maisonneuve denounces John Buridan as a materialist, the article looks for textual evidence that would support or otherwise refute this claim in Buridan’s works on natural philosophy. In particular, the article analyzes Buridan’s discussion of universal knowledge in the final redactions of his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physica and De anima, which turn out to complement each other. Here, Buridan asks if something extended and (...) material can have universal knowledge. Against the opinion commonly held, according to Buridan, not only by many of his contemporaries, but also by almost all of the ancient commentators, Buridan argues that traditional arguments against a materialistic theory of the human mind are not conclusive. After having removed the main stumbling blocks, he goes on to sketch a theory of universal knowledge that is compatible with the assumption that the human intellect is a material form. As an appendix, the paper contains an edition of the key question on universal knowledge in the penultimate redaction of John Buridan’s Physics commentary, which is made available in print for the first time here. (shrink)

But We're American… The presence of American Exceptionalism in the Speeches of George W. Bush This paper defines American exceptionalism as the notion held by Americans that their country is unique and has a specific role to play in the world. The origins of this notion are traced to 17th century Puritan settlers, who used the metaphor of being "a city upon a hill" to highlight their position as a moral example to the rest of the world. This element from (...) a sacral religion was transformed during the founding of the United States into an element of civil religion, and as such the metaphor and concept of American exceptionalism received a political connotation. The rise of America's political power coincided with a more active role in world politics, which was backed with a rhetoric emphasising unity and America's unique role. The clash between the passive and the more active reading of the exceptionalist metaphor and the struggles between sacral and civil religion coincide during the presidency of George W. Bush. The presence of these elements of political rhetoric is surveyed in a corpus of speeches by President Bush. (shrink)

In relation to the Kantian theory that moral judgments are imaginarily grounded, this contribution explores how moral agents experience and make use of this imaginary groundedness. Drawing from a strand of aesthetics that conceives of imagination as make-believe, the imaginary ground of moral judgment is theorized to stem from the interaction between active participants who pretend that their claims are grounded, and passive participants who are invited to go along. Based on this reconstruction, the experience of the moral imaginary is (...) argued to stem from a divided mind. It allows moral agents to be partly devoted to the mental and communicative attitude fitting the fictional world of groundedness, and partly to generating personal responses to moral claims. Using the experience of artistic fiction as an example, the actual experience of morality’s imaginary ground is finally located in the interplay between those two spheres. (shrink)

This article investigates Kant's theory of the "sublime". It points out, that Kant's theory, which describes the intensive aesthetic feelings called forth by outstanding natural or artificial phenomena, like earthquakes, tempests or pyramids, is also extended to include a theory of death. Death, the ultimate and outstanding border of life, can also inspire this feeling of the sublime. But Kant, who prefers theories of immortality to theories of final death, manages to avoid this conclusion in his tree "critics". It was (...) let to his disciples to develop the theory of sublime death. (shrink)

In its reaction on the terroristic attacks of September 9th, 2001, the US-government threatened Afghanistan's Taleban with war in order to force them to extradite terrorist leader Bin Laden; the Taleban said that they would not surrender to this kind of blackmail – and so, they were removed from Kabul by means of military force. The rivalling versions of this story depend crucially on notions such as "terrorism" and "blackmail". Obviously you'll gain public support for your preferrend version of the (...) story if you are able to determine how those notions are to be used. So we had better reflect about their very meaning and about the moral implications of their proper usage. To gain a deeper understanding of our notions of "blackmail" and "terrorism" I shall propose an extreme thought experiment: Cassandra's plan. Cassandra foresees that sooner or later one of the nuclear powers might take the liberty to use atomic bombs. From fright she founds an NGO for blackmailing the statesmen who are in charge of nuclear weapons; she announces in public that all ministers and leaders of any government shall be hunted down, and executed, whose soldiers drop but one atomic bomb. (Cassandra's NGO keeps killer teams in constant training so as to increase the effect of the threat; this is being financiated from private donations). In my paper I shall raise two questions (without claiming to provide definite answers). First, would we have to say that Cassandra's NGO was a terrorist organisation? Second, would it be morally wrong if Cassandra blackmailed statesmen in the way indicated? (shrink)